Direct aid will fail now – corruption, lack of resources, and poor infrastructure mean that public health systems are non-existent. Robert I. Rotberg, president of the World Peace Foundation and director of the Program on Intrastate Conflict and Conflict Resolution in the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 2005 (Battling Terrorism in the Horn ofAfrica, Rotberg (ed.), More quals: professor of political science and history at MIT; academic vice president at Tufts University; president of Lafayette College; Copyright: The World Peace Foundation and Brookings Institution, p. 5-6 [T Chenoweth])
A fourth critical component of governance is the creation of an enabling environment permissive of and conducive to economic growth and prosperity at both national and personal levels. This political good thus encompasses a prudently run money and banking system, usually guided by a central bank and lubricated by a national currency; a fiscal and institutional context within which citizens may pursue individual entrepreneurial goals and potentially prosper; and a regulatory environment appropriate to the economic aspirations and attributes of the nation-state. Only Kenya, reliant on tourism and agricultural exports, has a fully modern economy. Somalia is the outlier at the other end of the economic continuum, and all of the other nation-states are fragile economically. The Sudan has oil, but little else. (Yemen also has oil, but in diminishing amounts.) Yemen has an excellent port in Aden, Djibouti has a smaller port, and Eritrea has two. Ethiopia has coffee. But the real economic attainments of the nation-states of the greater Horn of Africa and Yemen region have been limited, largely because of scarce natural resources and harsh terrain. Moreover, none of the regimes in the region, except Kenya and Djibouti, is even marginally concerned with providing more than the rudiments of this good of economic growth. Additionally, corruption flourishes everywhere in the region, sapping efficiency, limiting foreign direct investment (except into the petroleum industry), and undermining other political goods like the rule of law and security."1 Infrastructure (the physical arteries of commerce), education, and medical treatment are other key political goods, nearly always the responsibilities of governments. Except for Kenya, all of the other countries and areas in the greater region are poor, with underdeveloped road and rail systems, creaking sea and river ports and airports, poor traditional telephone systems and limited teledensity, and low levels of Internet connectivity. Likewise, again except for Kenya and northern Sudan, health and educational systems are either nearly nonexistent or primitive (even by African standards). In the medical services field, for example, in 2001 there was one physician per 35,000 people in Ethiopia, one per 33,000 people in Eritrea, one per 25,000 people in Somalia, one per 11,000 people in the Sudan, one per 7,500 people in Kenya, one per 7,100 people in Djibouti, and one per 5,000 people in Yemen. In terms of the number of hospital beds per 1,000 people, Djibouti had more than two, Kenya and the Sudan more than one, and all the others a few tenths of a bed. Ethiopia had only 0.24 hospital beds per 1,000. Comparing health expenditures as a percentage of GDP, Kenya spent the most (nearly 8 percent), Djibouti and Eritrea followed, and Ethiopia brought up the rear with 1.4 percent.5 It comes as no surprise, given these startlingly low numbers for the delivery of health services, that infant mortality rates per 1,000 live births range from 133 in Somalia and 114 in Ethiopia down to a comparatively welcome figure of fifty-nine in Eritrea. Estimated life expectancy at birth thus ranges from a high of fifty-one years in Eritrea to a low of forty-two in Ethiopia. Only Kenya has a flourishing civil society. In Somalia, civil society is an oxymoron within warlord-controlled fiefdoms. It has been increasingly limited in Eritrea, as the chapter on that country makes evident. In the Sudan, civil society has been repressed in the North by the military rulers who have run the nation-state since 1989; elsewhere civil society is a casualty both of the old North-South war and the new war in Darfur. In Ethiopia, civil society has been slow to develop amid the tight embrace of authoritarianism and because of the restraints of traditional cultures of discourse. In Yemen, formal urban civil society is limited, but there is a long history of discourse and debate within tribal structures.
And, lack of health infrastructure in Africa is a barrier to the success of any other health aid. Gary Cohen, President of BD Medical, 1-5-07 (http://www.bd.com/press/newsroom/pdfs/3_HC_Infrastructure.pdf)
A primary thrust of these interventions has been provision of vitally needed pharmaceuticals, such as antiretrovirals for HIV/AIDS, to people who otherwise had no access. This will remain critical, but it is far from sufficient. The lack of health care infrastructure and capacity in sub-Saharan Africa is a more fundamental barrier, one that may soon inhibit the ability to deploy further increases in funding. The series of interventions that occurred over the past six years need to be regarded as a first stage which addressed the symptoms of insufficient health care capacity in Africa. It is now time to begin addressing the causes. One example is laboratory services. The provision of drug therapy in the absence of diagnostic testing -- used as a quality control to know when drugs should be administered and whether they are working -- is a potentially dangerous proposition. Already in sub- Saharan Africa there is widespread drug resistance among TB patients. But today, the methodology utilized most commonly in Africa to diagnose TB is over 120 years old. Resistance is also emerging to first line therapies for HIV/AIDS and Malaria. One can only imagine the consequences of massive drug resistance to these three diseases in Africa.Laboratory capabilities and infrastructure will be essential for preventing this. Among the mechanisms for building vitally needed infrastructure in Africa, public private sector partnerships (PPP’s) can play a critical role. With this in mind, BD (Becton, Dickinson and Company) is responding through cross-sector collaboration in the areas of advocacy, knowledge transfer, training, funding, and volunteerism, and by creating access to vitally needed technology on an affordable and sustainable basis. This White Paper identifies additional opportunities for private sector engagement, and we encourage other companies to take similar measures. The goal of improving the health and well being of the citizens of Africa is achievable. In our view, there is no practical alternative other than to devote all necessary efforts across the public and private sectors toward this goal.
Advantage 1: Infrastructure
Djiboutian infrastructure is failing – we must act now to ensure success throughout the entire region. Robert I. Rotberg, president of the World Peace Foundation and director of the Program on Intrastate Conflict and Conflict Resolution in the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 2005 (Battling Terrorism in the Horn ofAfrica, Rotberg (ed.), More quals: professor of political science and history at MIT; academic vice president at Tufts University; president of Lafayette College; Copyright: The World Peace Foundation and Brookings Institution, p. 11-12 [T Chenoweth])
Although a majority Somali-populated nation, Djibouti's colonial heritage is French. It never endured the misrule of a despot like Siad Barre, or Mengistu Haile Meriam in Ethiopia. It has been remarkably stable since gaining its independence in 1977; France has always maintained a large military presence outside the city of Djibouti and for many years advised ("controlled") the country's treasury. Because Djibouti is now an American and French garrison town, but more so because this diminutive nation-state guards the southern entrance to the Red Sea across from Yemen, it plays a key role in contemporary counterterror operations and will influence the manner in which the region and its neighbors respond to the challenges and opportunities of improved governance. Moreover, IGAD is based in Djibouti. If Yemen were to become a member or an associate member of IGAD, that organization could help significantly to knit the region together and strengthen its existing bulwarks against the rise and spread of terror. In the battle against terror, the government of Djibouti has been more proactive than others in the region. Despite limited resources, it has removed illegal immigrants for other reasons, shut financial institutions with terrorist links, and cooperated with foreign monitoring and collection operations. Most of all, President Ismail Omar Guelleh has moved determinedly to broker peace in Somalia, especially from 1999 to 2003. He continues to seek to exercise a peacemaking and security-bolstering role among his neighbors and regionally. Washington may wish to find ways to enhance Guelleh's mediation authority for the good of the peoples of the greater Horn of Africa region. But doing so will also mean assisting Djibouti with improving the living standards and economic, political, and social prospects of its own people. Helping to make Djibouti a developmental showcase would not hurt. The country's greatest need is a reliable source of potable water. Its aquifer is rap-idly being depleted and massive investments in modern desalination technology may be justified. With water, Djibouti could successfully irrigate its limited arable land and potentially grow more of its own food.But the people of Djibouti also require viable service and industrial employment opportunities. Creating them would help to mobilize jobs. In Djibouti, as in the region, jobs are at a premium. Creating opportunities for gainful employment is one of the more obvious and most likely methods of reducing the attractiveness of Al Qaeda and similar forms of terrorism. Djibouti could be developed as a regional transportation hub: its port and airport facilities (now managed by Dubai) could be expanded and the Addis Ababa railroad could be refurbished and upgraded. Djiboutians also require better educational opportunities in English, as well as in French and Arabic. From Djibouti's vantage point, writes Lange Schermerhorn in chapter 3 in this volume, everything that happens in the countries of the Horn impacts Djibouti, and conversely, Djibouti's political and economic health and welfare impinges on all of its neighbors. Now, more than ever, Djibouti needs a stable region that is developing in ways that will complement its own potential as a regional services hub. Therefore, policy with regard to Djibouti must be formulated knowing that every action in the region stimulates a reaction. Cooperating and collaborating with other donors to help Djibouti attain its objectives for the delivery of social services, education, and jobs should be an important U.S. policy objective in order to maintain the stability of this major regional entry point.
A. Water – The Horn is the world’s most severe drought area – more aid is needed now to save 70 million from starvation. IRIN, 6-26-07 (HORN OF AFRICA: Act now to combat food insecurity - UN officials, http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/IRIN/0fade47a3a4a004d0552236dc4085745.htm [T Chenoweth])
At least 20 million people in the drought-plagued Horn of Africa could need emergency aid if action is not taken immediately to combat food insecurity in the region, United Nations officials said on 26 June. "The Horn is hit by some of the world's most severe food crises and they are coming faster and more [furiously] because of climate change, environmental degradation, political and armed conflicts and a host of other factors," Kjell Magne Bondevik, the UN Special Humanitarian Envoy to the Horn of Africa, told a news conference in Nairobi, the Kenyan capital. "We all now need to show the commitment to end this cycle of despair and disaster, which if not stopped could next see over 20 million people in need of assistance," he said. Bondevik spoke at the end of two days of talks in Nairobi between the six governments of the region - Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia and Uganda; the UN, donors, research organisations, the private sector and non-governmental organisations. The governments and the UN, he said, had agreed on a road map to combat food insecurity. At least 170 projects would be scaled up, including tree planting, rehabilitating land, veterinary services for drought-stricken pastoralists; agricultural advisory services for farmers; bee-keeping; dairy development; fisheries; micro-enterprises; eco-tourism; digging wells and irrigation systems, and establishing vegetable gardens. "Although much has been done in this regard, we must work harder to improve food security in the region; the hard work starts now," Bondevik said. "We have identified what works best and where. The biggest challenge is to scale up successes to extinguish hunger in the Horn rather than just fighting fires each time one breaks out." He added: "If we want to change the Horn so it supports people instead of increasingly making them victims, I appeal to you all to back this campaign on behalf of those brave survivors of one of the harshest environments in the world. Otherwise this failure will only haunt us all." According to a joint statement by the UN World Food Programme (WFP) and the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), at least 70 million people – 45 percent of the total population – in the Horn live in abject poverty and face food shortages. Four major droughts hit the region in the past six years.
And, the impact is linear – the more assistance the less people die each year. Furthermore, these water shortages will create conflict. Reuters. 11-9-06. “Rich states must help tackle water crisis – UNDP” http://today.reuters.com/News/CrisesArticle.aspx?storyId=L08923976&WTmodLoc=IntNewsHome_C4_Crises-2
CAPE TOWN, Nov 9 (Reuters) - The world's richest states must spearhead efforts to tackle a water and sanitation crisis that is killing and spreading disease among millions and holding back economies, especially in Africa, a U.N. report said on Thursday. The United Nations Development Programme's (UNDP) 2006 Human Development Report recommended that all governments guarantee every person at least 20 litres of clean water a day and spend at least one percent of GDP on water and sanitation. The report, which is regarded as a snapshot on the world's progress on key development issues, also urged the most industrialised countries to raise international aid to poorer nations by $3.4 billion to $4 billion annually. Without concerted action by the G8, a grouping that includes the United States and Britain, millions in the developing world will continue to be plagued by avoidable poverty, poor health and diminished economic opportunities, the report warned. "National governments need to draw up credible plans and strategies for tackling the crisis in water and sanitation," said Kevin Watkins, lead author of the report, which was released in Cape Town. "But we also need a global action plan -- with active buy-in from the G8 countries -- to focus fragmented international efforts to mobilise resources and galvanise political action by putting water and sanitation front and centre on the development agenda," he said. The call to action came amid worrying signs large tracts of the developing world will not meet eight U.N. Millennium development goals agreed by world leaders -- ranging from reducing extreme poverty to halting the spread of AIDS by 2015. If current trends hold, sub-Saharan Africa would only reach the U.N. Millennium clean water target in 2040. The Arab nations are 27 years off the mark. LIVES OF MILLIONS AT STAKE At stake are the lives of millions of children as well as the health and economic well-being of more than two billion others living in developing nations, where drinking contaminated water from drains or streams is often the norm. About 1.8 million children around the world die each year from diarrhoea that could be prevented by access to clean water or a toilet and almost half of those in the developing world are sick at any given time due to poor water and sanitation. Besides health benefits, supporters predict a global clean water campaign would spur economic growth in regions such as sub-Saharan Africa, which loses five percent of its GDP each year due to poor water and sanitation, according to the report. Each dollar invested in water and sanitation improvements would return $8 through increased productivity, reduced healthcare costs and other economic windfalls, especially for the poor who often pay more for clean water, the report stated. Efforts to better manage water resources could also reduce the likelihood of wars and armed conflicts erupting over ownership and access to a basic necessity that is increasingly viewed by governments as a prized economic asset.
B. Roads – Road infrastructure is lagging behind the rest of the world in Africa, cutting it off from the international economy and creating poverty. Gumisai Mutume (Writing for Africa Recovery for a U.N Summit Meeting, “Building an efficient road network: Public-private partnerships hold the key to regional infrastructure”. Vol.16 #2-3. 9/02. Page 23 http://www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/vol16no2/162reg4.htm) [Gunnarsdottir]
As far back as the 1960s, architects of African integration agreed that building infrastructure was vital to lubricate the wheels of intra-African trade and distribute its benefits regionally. The continent's leaders embarked on ambitious projects such as the trans-African highways -- segments of which would eventually stretch from Cairo to Dakar, Tripoli to Windhoek and Lagos to Mombasa. These would provide access to the sea to 15 landlocked countries and improve regional links. "Unfortunately, like the economic integration process, regional infrastructure cooperation and integration has not been an outstanding success," notes eminent Nigerian scholar and proponent of integration, Prof. Adebayo Adedeji. At the turn of the millennium a major drawback to trade among African countries remains the dire lack of infrastructure. Crowded road in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania: There are too few roads in Africa, and they are deteriorating.Africa lags behind the rest of the world in all aspects of infrastructure development -- quantity, quality, cost and access. In 1997, Africa (excluding South Africa) had 171,000 kilometres of paved roads -- about 18 per cent less than Poland, a country roughly the size of Zimbabwe. As efforts to complete the trans-African highways continue, the quality of existing roads is deteriorating. In 1992 about 17 per cent of sub-Saharan Africa's primary roads were paved, but by 1998 the figure had fallen to 12 per cent, reports the World Bank. Today, more than 80 per cent of unpaved roads are only in fair condition and 85 per cent of rural feeder roads are in poor condition and cannot be used during the wet season. In Ethiopia, 70 per cent of the population has no access to all-weather roads. In many countries, roads are concentrated in urban areas or around coastal ports -- trade routes established during colonial times for the overseas shipment of commodities. Far fewer roads link neighbouring countries in regional networks. Costly transport woes Poor infrastructure makes the costs of transporting goods in Africa among the highest in the world, notes ECA Executive Secretary K.Y. Amoako. African goods are therefore less competitive with those from other regions. A poor transport system "acts as a non-tariff trade barrier," concurs Prof. Kenneth Button, a public policy expert at George Mason University in the US, who has conducted transportation studies for the European Union. World Bank studies show that a 10 per cent drop in transport costs could result in a 25 per cent increase in total African trade. The Bank also concludes that only about 25 per cent of the decline in Africa's share of world exports can be attributed to poor prices, while the rest is due to non-price factors such as poor infrastructure and information services. Bad roads, aged vehicles and lax regulations also cost lives.
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And, the task force creates infrastructure to solve water and transportation issues. CENTCOM, 12-06 (Fact Sheet, U.S. Central Command: Combined Joint Task Force-Horn Of Africa Mission; http://www.hoa.centcom.mil/resources/english/facts.asp# [T Chenoweth]) The Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa is a unit of United States Central Command that conducts operations and training to assist host nations to combat terrorism in order to establish a secure environment and enable regional stability. The mission is focused on detecting, disrupting and ultimately defeating transnational terrorist groups operating in the region—denying safe havens, external support and material assistance for terrorist activity. CJTF-HOA counters the re-emergence of transnational terrorism in the region through civil-military operations and support of non-governmental organization operations, enhancing the long-term stability of the region. CJTF-HOA provides short-term assistance by providing clean water, functional schools, improved roadways and improved medical facilities. Long-term goals include working with host nations to improve national security. Regional stability is built through capacity building operations such as civil affairs and military-to-military training; engineering andhumanitarian support; medical, dental and veterinarian civil action programs (MEDCAP, DENCAP, VETCAP); security training for border and coastal areas; and maritime training with host nations.
Advantage 2: US Leadership
Current military policies create resentment and opposition to US prescence. Princeton N. Lyman, Adjunct Senior Fellow for Africa Policy Studies at CFR, and J. Stephen Morrison, Director of CSIS Africa Program; Jan/Feb 04 (The Terrorist Threat in Africa., Foreign Affairs, 00157120, Vol. 83, Issue 1, Business Source Complete [T Chenoweth]
In 2002, to combat terrorism in the Horn, theUnited States created the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), which involves 1,800 U.S. soldiers and is backed by U.S. Central Command. Based in Djibouti, CJTF-HOA's mission is to deter, preempt, and disable terrorist threats emanating principally from Somalia, Kenya, and Yemen, assisted by a multinational naval interdiction force. In June 2003, President Bush announced a $100 million package of counterterrorism measures to be spent in the Horn over 15 months. Half of these funds will support coastal and border security programs administered by the U.S. Department of Defense, $10 million will be spent on the Kenyan Anti-terror Police Unit, and $14 million will support Muslim education. East African governments have been largely receptive to engagement with the United States. Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Uganda even identified themselves as U.S. coalition partners during Operation Iraqi Freedom. But the battle for public opinion is far from won. The travel alerts for Kenya and Tanzania issued by Washington and London in 2003 are a case in point. The advisories were widely unpopular -- disrupting international air traffic and undermining the recovery of the region's tourist trade -- and have intensified debates in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam over the wisdom of partnering with Washington. Strong U.S. support for antiterrorist measures under consideration by the Kenyan Parliament has also provoked anger, particularly from civil libertarians (still reeling from the repressive rule of Daniel arap Moi) and from Muslim clerics (who claim that the proposed controls are fundamentally anti-Islam). If it is to gain local support in Kenya and elsewhere, theUnited States must adopt a less heavy-handed approach. To achieve this, Washington needs a stronger diplomatic and intelligence presence on the ground. At present, the United States lacks a diplomatic resident in several key locations, including Mombasa, Hargeysa (in northern Somalia), and Zanzibar, and it has weak links to other Muslim areas in East Africa. For example, Washington has yet to overcome its post-1993 phobia about engagement with Somalia, a country that sustains al Qaeda infrastructure inside Kenya. More broadly, it remains to be seen whether the Bush administration can provide sufficient political and financial leadership to back up its multiple and ambitious operations in the region, given worsening budgetary pressures and competing demands in Iraq and Afghanistan.
And, Military outreach operations are a unique issue that develops soft power and trains troops for state building. CSM, 6-22-07 (Ginny Hill, “Military focuses on development in Africa: In Djibouti, US forces combat terrorism with civil affairs work. Will this be a model for a future US military command in Africa?” http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0622/p07s02-woaf.html [T Chenoweth])
Stephen Morrison, director of the Africa program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, says [that] he believes [that] this far-flung fieldwork provides valuable training opportunities. "They're developing essential deployment skills, such as construction, camp maintenance, and team-building," he says. "And it's an ideal chance to practice community interaction in a semi-hostile environment." Hathaway, whose Djibouti deployment came after five months in Iraq, says [that] a unique aspect of his Hol-Hol mission is exposure to the local population. In Iraq, he survived incoming mortar rounds to build a runway and military housing, but he never left the base. "Here, we see the same people [every day], we're relating one-to-one." In an effort to overcome the language barrier, the Gulfport team defies Djibouti's punishing summer temperatures to play regular soccer matches with the local children. "In the beginning, we were suspicious, but now we've seen that they are good people and they're doing good things for our village," says Abdul-Rahman Bossis, an unemployed Hol-Hol resident. Director of Public Affairs Major David Malakoff says [that] he believes [that] these outreach efforts can foster a positive impression of the American military, but he is honest about the challenge. "How much of a difference are we going to make? That's hard to say. It's not something that we can judge short-term," he says. "Our target group is today's children, so we're not going to know for 10 or 15 years. But we hope that, in the long run, we could be saving lives." Michael O'Hanlon, foreign-policy analyst at the Brookings Institution, thinks that civil-affairs programs "created in partnership with host governments and combined with efforts to foster economic progress can be very useful as part of a broader strategy."
And, hegemony will collapse without progressively changing perceptions toward the military. New Straits Times, 8-4-01 (R.S. McCoy, “Dangerous and flawed systems,” Saturday forum; Pg. 14, Lexis [T Chenoweth]) In the coming decades of the 21st century, factors most likely to influence the development of conflict are the impact of globalisation on the wealth-poverty divide, environmental constraints on development, climate change, diminishing strategic resources, increasing pressures from mass migration, and the spread of military technologies, not least, missiles and weapons of mass destruction. Anti-elite action from within the marginalised majority and politically motivated paramilitary action indicate a serious lack of structure and culture for dialogue, within the context of middle power states unwilling to accept Western hegemony. The Western perception that the status quo can be maintained by military means is an approach that is not only unjust and ethically unacceptable, but is also not even sustainable in military terms, given the vulnerabilities of urban-industrial states to political violence and asymmetric warfare. It follows that it is necessary to develop a new security paradigm, based on policies likely to enhance peace and limit conflict, by reversing socio-economic polarisation, enforcing sustainable economic development and environmental protection, controlling weapons and missile proliferation, and reducing militarisation. It is essential to learn from the experience of the Cold War and fashion a new security paradigm from those lessons. The Bush administration is attempting to establish rapport with other governments, but hard line unilateral initiatives and withdrawal from international agreements are not helping. The US has a record of cooperation and progressive leadership in the past that lighted the darkness of international relations and enhanced the quest for peace and justice. It cannot now turn away its face and live in the unreal world of exceptionalism.
And, US hegemony is critical to deter a global nuclear war. Khalilzad, Policy Analyst at the Rand Corporation, 95 (Zalmay, “Losing the Moment?: The United States and the World after the Cold War,” The Washington Quarterly, Spring)
Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global rival or a return to multipolarity for the indefinite future. On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not as an end in itself, but because a world in which the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the global environment would be more open and more receptive to American values -- democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world's major problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts. Finally,U.S.leadership would help preclude the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling the United States and the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange. U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system.
<INSERT AFRICOM SCENARIO???>
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Advantage 3: Terrorism
Current focus on hard line counter-terrorism fails. More resources are needed to address the root causes of terrorism. Josh Meyer, LA Times Staff Writer, 3-18-7 (In Terrorism Fight, Diplomacy Gets Shortchanged, http://www.thepeacealliance.org/content/view/307/1/)
President Bush, members of Congress and virtually all counter-terrorism experts have acknowledged that defeating terrorists cannot be accomplished solely by dropping bombs on them. Ultimately, they say, ending terrorism will come only by addressing its underlying causes. "Our long-term strategy to keep the peace is to help change the conditions that give rise to extremism and terror by spreading the universal principle of human liberty," Bush said in March 2005. But a close look at theUnited States' counter-terrorism priorities shows a strategy going in a different direction. In recent years, the Pentagon has received a larger share of the counter-terrorism budget, whereas "indirect action" programs to win the campaign through diplomacy and other nonmilitary means have struggled for funding and attention, according to a review of budget documents and interviews with dozens of current and former U. S. officials. Nonmilitary counter-terrorism programs have budgets that are measured in millions instead of billions, and in many cases are seeing their funding remain flat or drop. Even within the Pentagon, many "soft power" programs, which don't include direct military action, appear to be getting squeezed out as more money goes to support combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and special forces missions elsewhere. Some top counter-terrorism officials, seeing their noncombat programs languishing, are leaving the government, including a top Pentagon official. Three at the State Department who ran the highly regarded Regional Strategic Initiative are also leaving. And increasingly, even civilian anti-terrorism operations are being run by current or former military members. The shift has troubled many terrorism experts. The U. S. approach to counter-terrorism is that "enemies simply need to be killed or imprisoned so that global terrorism or the Iraqi insurgency will end," Bruce Hoffman, a senior fellow at the Combating Terrorism Center at the U. S. Military Academy, told a House Armed Services subcommittee last month. "This is a monumental failing," Hoffman said, "not only because decapitation strategies have rarely worked in countering mass mobilization, terrorist or insurgent campaigns, but also because Al Qaeda's ability to continue this struggle is … predicated on its capacity to attract new recruits" by publicizing U. S. military actions.
Current military policy makes terrorism inevitable – only revitalizing military aid can solve the global war on terror. Prof. Thomas P.M. Barnett, Senior Strategic Researcher at the U.S. Naval War College and Senior Managing Director of Enterra Solutions, 6-27-07 (Esquire, “The Americans Have Landed,” http://www.esquire.com/features/africacommand0707 [T Chenoweth])
"We could have solved all of East Africa in less than eight weeks," says the Centcom source, who was involved in the planning. Central Command was extremely wary of being portrayed in the media as Ethiopia's puppet master. In fact, its senior leaders wanted to keep America's participation entirely secret. The goal was for Ethiopia to get all the credit, further bolstering America's controversial but burgeoning military ties with Meles Zenawi's increasingly authoritarian regime. Proud Kenya, still visibly nervous from the 1998 embassy bombing, would have been happy with a very quiet thank-you. It was a good plan. And it was leaked to the press almost as soon as it started. Those involved in the Central Command operation suspected two sources: 1) somebody in the Office of the Secretary of Defense who couldn't wait to trumpet their success to bitter personal rivals in the State Department, or 2) a dime dropper from our embassy in Kenya who simply couldn't stand the notion that the Pentagon had once again suckered State into a secret war. The first New York Times piece in early January broke the story of the initial AC-130 bombardment, incorrectly identifying a U.S. military base in Djibouti as the launching point. That leak just let the cat out of the bag, tipping off the main target, a senior CIC leader named Aden Hashi Ayro, who, according to Centcom intelligence, had been completely fooled up to that point, thinking the Ethiopians had somehow gotten the jump on him. Ayro survived his injuries, and he's now back in action in Mogadishu and, by all accounts, mad as hell at both the Ethiopians and the Americans. Six weeks and a second Times story later, the shit really hit the fan in Addis Ababa. Now the intensely proud Ethiopians, who had done all the heavy lifting in the operation, were being portrayed as bit players in their own war -- simpleton proxies of the fiendishly clever Americans. After angry denials were issued (Meles's spokesman called the story a "fabrication"), the Ethiopians decided that if the Americans were so hot to mastermind another intervention in Somalia, they would just wash their hands of this mess as quickly as possible. The return of the foreign fighters to Mogadishu's nasty mix, along with Ethiopia's fit of pique, quickly sent the situation in Somalia spiraling downward. The transitional Somali government, backed by the United Nations, is faltering, and in scenes reminiscent of America's last misadventures in Mog, both Ethiopian troops and African Union peacekeepers are taking fire from 360 degrees' worth of pissed-off Somali clans determined to -- once again -- drive off the invading infidels. Osama bin Laden himself couldn't have written a better ending. Naturally, it wasn't supposed to happen this way. America's Central Command set up shop in Djibouti in May 2003, moving ashore a Marine-led Joint Task Force that had been established six months earlier aboard the command ship Mount Whitney to capture and kill Al Qaeda fighters fleeing American forces in Afghanistan and Iraq. The task force did register one immediate big hit in November 2002: A top Al Qaeda leader was taken out in Yemen by a Hellfire air-to-ground missile launched from an unmanned Predator drone in a scene right out of Syriana. But other than that, the great rush of rats fleeing the sinking ship has not yet materialized, and so the Marines took up residence in an old French Foreign Legion base located on Djibouti's rocky shore, just outside the capital. Uncomfortable just sitting around, the Marines quickly refashioned the task force with the blessing of General John Abizaid, then head of Central Command, who envisioned Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) as a sort of strategic inoculant. If the Marines weren't going to get to kill anybody, then they'd train the locals to do it instead. But CJTF-HOA, whose area of responsibility stretched from Sudan down to Kenya, soon evolved into something so much more: an experiment in combining defense, diplomacy, and development -- the so-called three-D approach so clearly lacking in America's recent postwar reconstruction efforts elsewhere. Because the task force didn't own the sovereign space it was operating in, as U.S. forces in Afghanistan and Iraq did, the Marines were forced to work under and through the American ambassadors, their State Department country teams, and the attached U.S. Agency for International Development missions. If little of that cooperation was occurring in Kabul and Baghdad, then maybe Africa would be better suited.The Horn of Africa was supposed to be Washington's bureaucratic mea culpa for the Green Zone, a proving ground for the next generation of interagency cooperation that fuels America's eventual victory in what Abizaid once dubbed the "long war" against radical Islam. But as its first great test in Somalia demonstrated, the three D's are still a long way from being synchronized, and as the Pentagon sets up its new Africa Command in the summer of 2008, the time for sloppy off-Broadway tryouts is running out. Eventually, Al Qaeda's penetration of Muslim Africa will happen -- witness the stunning recent appearance of suicide bombers in Casablanca -- and either the three D's will answer this challenge, or this road show will close faster than you can say "Black Hawk down."
And, the US must build up its military aid to Africa to destroy terrorist shelters and funding mechanisms globally. Princeton N. Lyman, Adjunct Senior Fellow for Africa Policy Studies at CFR, and J. Stephen Morrison, Director of CSIS Africa Program; Jan/Feb 04 (The Terrorist Threat in Africa., Foreign Affairs, 00157120, Vol. 83, Issue 1, Business Source Complete [T Chenoweth]
ON AUGUST 7, 1998, two massive bombs exploded outside of the U.S. embassies in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya, killing 224 people -- including 12 Americans -- and injuring 5,000. Responsibility was quickly traced to al Qaeda. Four years later, al Qaeda operatives struck again, killing 15 people in an Israeli-owned hotel near Mombasa, Kenya, and simultaneously firing missiles at an Israeli passenger jet taking off from Mombasa's airport. An alarmed United States responded to these attacks with conviction. In addition to proposing significant increases in development assistance and a major initiative on HIV/AIDS, the Bush administration has designated the greater Horn of Africa a front-line region in its global war against terrorism and has worked to dismantle al Qaeda infrastructure there. At the same time, however, theUnited States has failed to recognize the existence of other, less visible, terrorist threats elsewhere on the African continent. Countering the rise of grass-roots extremism has been a central part of U.S. strategy in the Middle East, but the same has not generally been true for Africa. In Nigeria, for example, a potent mix of communal tensions, radical Islamism, and anti-Americanism has produced a fertile breeding ground for militancy and threatens to tear the country apart. South Africa has seen the emergence of a violent Islamist group. And in West and Central Africa, criminal networks launder cash from illicit trade in diamonds, joining forces with corrupt local leaders to form lawless bazaars that are increasingly exploited by al Qaeda to shelter its assets. As the war on terrorism intensifies in Kenya and elsewhere, radicals might migrate to more accessible, war-ravaged venues across the continent. The Bush administration must deal with these threats by adopting a more holistic approach to fighting terrorism in Africa. Rather than concentrate solely on shutting down existing al Qaeda cells, it must also deal with the continent's fundamental problems -- economic distress, ethnic and religious fissures, fragile governance, weak democracy, and rampant human rights abuses -- that create an environment in which terrorists thrive. The United States must also eliminate the obstacles to developing a coherent Africa policy that exist in Washington. Counterterrorism programs for the region are consistently underfinanced, responsibilities are divided along archaic bureaucratic lines, there is no U.S. diplomatic presence in several strategic locations, and long-term imperatives are consistently allowed to be eclipsed by short-term humanitarian demands. The war on terrorism might make officials realize what they should have known earlier: that Africa cannot be kept at the back of the queue forever if U.S. security interests are to be advanced.
And, terrorism threatens the survival of civilization Yonah Alexander, professor and director of the Inter-University for Terrorism Studies in Israel and the United States. “Terrorism Myths and Realities,” Washington Times. August 27, 2003. http://www.washingtontimes.com/commentary/20030827-084256-8999r.htm
Last week's brutal suicide bombings in Baghdad and Jerusalem have once again illustrated dramatically that the international community failed, thus far at least, to understand the magnitude and implications of the terrorist threats to the very survival of civilization itself. Even the United States and Israel have for decades tended to regard terrorism as a mere tactical nuisance or irritant rather than a critical strategic challenge to their national security concerns. It is not surprising, therefore, that on September 11, 2001, Americans were stunned by the unprecedented tragedy of 19 al Qaeda terrorists striking a devastating blow at the center of the nation's commercial and military powers. Likewise, Israel and its citizens, despite the collapse of the Oslo Agreements of 1993 and numerous acts of terrorism triggered by the second intifada that began almost three years ago, are still "shocked" by each suicide attack at a time of intensive diplomatic efforts to revive the moribund peace process through the now revoked cease-fire arrangements (hudna). Why are the United States and Israel, as well as scores of other countries affected by the universal nightmare of modern terrorism surprised by new terrorist "surprises"? There are many reasons, including misunderstanding of the manifold specific factors that contribute to terrorism's expansion, such as lack of a universal definition of terrorism, the religionization of politics, double standards of morality, weak punishment of terrorists, and the exploitation of the media by terrorist propaganda and psychological warfare. Unlike their historical counterparts, contemporary terrorists have introduced a new scale of violence in terms of conventional and unconventional threats and impact. The internationalization and brutalization of current and future terrorism make it clear we have entered an Age of Super Terrorism (e.g. biological, chemical, radiological, nuclear and cyber) with its serious implications concerning national, regional and global security concerns.
Plan: The United States federal government should substantially increase its public health assistance to sub-Saharan Africa by expanding the public health infrastructure programs of the United States Combined Joint Task Force for the Horn of Africa.
Contention 2: We’re Topical –
Health infrastructure is key to public health Pekka Puska (“WHO Director—General election: public health infrastructures” 10/27/06 Pg. 1401 Vol. 368 No. 9545 ISSN: 0140-6736 p. Lexis) [Gunnarsdottir] Without a concerted effort by WHO and others to strengthen public-health infrastructure, existing public-health programmes will not realise their potential and new ones will not be fully implemented. More urgently, without strong public-health infrastructures, countries will not be able to respond rapidly and in a coordinated manner to threats such as pandemic influenza. A centrally organised national public-health infrastructure is essential to ensuring that essential public-health functions, as defined by the Pan American Health Organization,4 are met. Such an infrastructure-including a coordinated system for outbreak investigation, monitoring, and surveillance, training, health education, research, laboratory services, and other functions-is vital to success, in both chronic and infectious diseases.
Contention 3: Solvency
They can’t win a unique disad – the US is increasing efforts now but they only create false commitment. Princeton N. Lyman, Adjunct Senior Fellow for Africa Policy Studies at CFR, and J. Stephen Morrison, Director of CSIS Africa Program; Jan/Feb 04 (The Terrorist Threat in Africa., Foreign Affairs, 00157120, Vol. 83, Issue 1, Business Source Complete [T Chenoweth]
Even more critical than combating al Qaeda's financial maneuvering is confronting the cause of the organization's regional resurgence: the anarchy and conflict engendered by West and Central Africa's failed and failing states. To date, theUnited States has offered neither the leadership nor the resources needed to deal with this problem properly. U.S. local diplomatic capacities remain weak, and initiatives are episodic and vulnerable to downward budgetary pressures. Each time theUnited States appears to offer greater commitment to the region, it pulls back, suggesting that the administration does not see it as a critical part of its global antiterrorist strategy.
And, success of the task force is key to AFRICOM and continent wide solvency - this prevents future interventions and conflict. Prof. Thomas P.M. Barnett, Senior Strategic Researcher at the U.S. Naval War College and Senior Managing Director of Enterra Solutions, 6-27-07 (Esquire, “The Americans Have Landed,” http://www.esquire.com/features/africacommand0707 [T Chenoweth])
America is going to have an Africa Command for the same reason people buy real estate -- it's a good investment. Too many large, hostile powers surround Central Asia for the radical jihadists to expand there, but Africa? Africa's the strategic backwater of the world. Nobody cares about Africa except Western celebrities. So as the Middle East middle-ages over the next three decades and Asia's infrastructural build-out is completed, only Africa will remain as a source for both youth-driven revolution and cheap labor and commodities. Toss in global warming and you've got a recipe for the most deprived becoming the most depraved. The U.S., through its invasion and botched occupation of Iraq, has dramatically sped up globalization's frightening reformatting process in the Middle East, and with Africa on deck, theUnited States military is engaging in a highly strategic flanking maneuver. Africa Command promises to be everything Central Command has failed to become. It will be interagency from the ground up. It will be based on interactions with locals first and leaders second. It will engage in preemptive nation-building instead of preemptive regime change. It will "reduce the future battlespace" that America has neither intention nor desire to own. It'll be Iraq done right. Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa here in Djibouti is the clear model for what comes next, according to Rear Admiral Bob Moeller, who heads up the Defense Department's transition team planning Africom's structure. It is the franchise that will be replicated across the entire continent.
And, the plan solves public health infrastructure which spills over to terrorism and good governance. Other measures are impossible unless the military acts first. Robert I. Rotberg, president of the World Peace Foundation and director of the Program on Intrastate Conflict and Conflict Resolution in the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 2005 (Battling Terrorism in the Horn ofAfrica, Rotberg (ed.), More quals: professor of political science and history at MIT; academic vice president at Tufts University; president of Lafayette College; Copyright: The World Peace Foundation and Brookings Institution, p. 6-8 [T Chenoweth]) The eradication both of existing terrorist cells and potential future terrorist threats and combinations cannot be achieved without careful, considered attention to uplifting governance in general throughout the region and boosting particular political goods selectively, country by country. Yet, even if theUnited States and the European Union (EU) were to expend appropriate sums to assist the governments of the region with improving aspects of governance, not all of these nation-states would embrace or welcome such initiatives. Few are anxious to chance their control or dominance internally. Few are as desirous as they might be, and fewer are able, to deliver political goods of the quality and in the quantities that would significantly help to achieve the aspirations of their peoples. The quality of the rule of law or economic enablement, much less domestic security and political freedom, will not change for the better without newly created partnerships forged for such ends between the United States, the EU, and many if not all of the countries in the greater Horn of Africa region. Hence, because theUnited States desperately wants to reduce the threat of terrorism, Washington must craft new, broad policy initiatives toward the region as a whole and toward the critical nation-states individually. CJTF-HOA, understaffed as it is, cannot be expected to bear the burden of nation building in the Horn of Africa and Yemen. There are ample opportunities for multinational coordination with regard to improving good governance in the region. France has long had a military and political presence in Djibouti. Italy has an interest, from colonial times, in the region, especially Somalia and Eritrea. Britain has colonial links to Kenya, Somaliland, and the Sudan. Norway played a substantial role in negotiating a peace agreement between the Sudan's North and South. The EU as a whole has a variety of ties to the region and to individual countries. The United States once had an important listening post in Eritrea, enjoys naval rights in Kenya, was alternately allied with Ethiopia and Somalia, and has suffered direct attack in Yemen and Kenya. It also has a military base in Djibouti. Americans and Europeans should cooperate to increase governmental capabilities in the region. Working together, they can build new and maintain existing infrastructures. They can find ways to create jobs in a region typified by high unemployment. Local educational efforts are few, leading to high rates of underemployment among secondary school leavers and others with less training. Europeans and Americans can direct their attention to such critical needs, can upgrade health facilities in the crucial battles against HIV/AIDS (increasingly a menace to Ethiopia and Somalia), tuberculosis, and malaria, as well as against dangerous epizootic diseases like Rift Valley fever and rinderpest. They should support local efforts to embed the rule of law and expand political freedom. Positive activities in each of these arenas will directly and indirectly strengthen security and counterterrorism capabilities. The battle against terrorism is as much, if not more, a battle for improved governance and, as a consequence, for local hearts and minds. Although France, Italy, and Britain have a long-standing expert knowledge of portions of the region and high-level staff fluent in local languages, theUnited States no longer possesses the regional expertise and capable linguists that it once had in the Department of State, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the several military services. Indeed, the greater Horn of Africa region (Yemen excepted) is in too many respects a terra incognita to Washington. Intelligence personnel responsible for overseeing the region may have no direct acquaintance with it. U.S. embassies and consulates are fewer than they were in the 1980s; budget cuts and personnel retrenchments have left U.S. diplomatic, intelligence, and military services impoverished in terms of an intimate knowledge of the region and the countries that it comprises. Although Washington helped to ensure the ultimate delivery of the Sudanese peace pact of early 2005, there was still no permanent American ambassador resident in Khartoum (based elsewhere since 1997) and no equivalent presence in Somalia. Indeed, Washington lacks any coherent vision for integrating and advancing American diplomatic and security initiatives in the region. The struggle against terrorism requires just such a far-ranging vision, directed and coordinated at the highest levels. The battle against terror in the vulnerable countries along the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean is best prosecuted from a holistic regional perspective. The threat is transnational and respects no boundaries. In any event, none of
international land or sea borders presents an effective barrier to infiltrators. Drugs and arms smugglers and cattle and sheep rustlers can cross almost anywhere at will. A history of interpenetration, long decades of evasion, tribal or warrior dominance of frontier areas remote from national capitals, adherence to customary entrepreneurial obligations, and the absence of robust security contingents beyond major cities make regional measures and cooperation necessary, urgent, and probably insufficient. The regional Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) tries weakly to organize relevant common responses. Bringing Yemen into IGAD would be sensible, and helpful in forging a more vigorous common approach to terror and its eradication. (But Yemen may not wish to be considered "African," and IGAD members might resist the inclusion of a new country.) There is no substitute for greater U.S. involvement in any and all forums for the greater Horn of Africa region and Yemen. As important as a vastly strengthened regional approach will be, Washington also needs a nuanced new policy crafted for and appropriate to the region and each of its countries.
And, military health assistance creates sustainable health care by developing African capabilities. William Fox, Command Surgeon of the Joint Readiness Training Center, 97 (MILITARY MEDICAL OPERATIONS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: THE DoD "POINT OF THE SPEAR" FOR A NEW CENTURY, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub202.pdf)
As a matter of "homeland defense," the United States must increase disease surveillance and research in Africa and elsewhere in the developing world. The basic capability currently exists in DoD, though it is extremely limited. An expanded capability must include cooperative efforts with African nations that emphasize outbreak isolation, containment and elimination. This action will directly assist African nations in attenuating disease threats, and allow them to build the capabilities to provide their own containment and elimination programs for the future. Research and surveillance clinics, staffed by U. S. and host nation personnel, should be established in each of the four major subregions of the subcontinent (east, west, central and south). It is worth noting that these activities will afford the United States an enhanced capability to deal not only with "acts Page 27 22 of nature," but also with deliberate uses of biological weapons by a future enemy. • Increasing the national disease surveillance efforts should be linked with an increase in exercises of the scope and capability of the 1994/1995 MEDFLAG series. Such exercises should focus on education and training to improve disease prevention, hygiene, public sanitation, disease vector control methods, disaster management and medical expertise for cases of mass refugees. Medical civic action projects must focus on assisting the host nation in projecting and stabilizing the medical infrastructure and medical care capability within the areas of greatest need. Mass immunization of children, basic dental and medical care, and medical "train the trainer" programs are highly effective. These exercises greatly enhance the skills of personnel and units in combined and joint task force operations. The relatively low threat environment makes it a good training venue. This deliberate planning and execution can better prepare U. S. military units and higher commands for more rapid response requirements such as disaster relief. The additional benefit of having worked with and trained numerous African personnel could facilitate the rapid inclusion of trained African medical care responders in future disaster relief operations in Africa and elsewhere in the world. • As an admittedly more complex and problematic issue, DoD must have a regional or sub-unified command that can provide a full-time focus on Africa. As noted earlier, the African continental land mass falls under the responsibility of two U. S. military commands (the U. S. European Command and the U. S. Central Command) whose primary focus is elsewhere. Islands surrounding the continent fall under the purview of other commands. The U. S. European Command, in times of crisis in Europe, cannot devote the necessary attention to the 40 African countries that are within its area of responsibility. DoD can no longer afford simply to wait and react to the next crisis in Africa. A regional command separate from the U. S. European Command or the U. S. Central Command should be established to evaluate, plan and execute regional military exercises and operations. A more specific regional focus would enhance DoD coordination and cooperation with the country teams, USAID, NGOs, and PVOs, as well as African organizations such as the Organization of African Unity. One result of instituting just these three DoD changes will be a powerful preventive defense program which, if melded with a preventive diplomacy program, could have a significant bearing on African regional stability. A failure to implement these changes will, at a minimum, ensure that larger and less-well-prepared forces must be rapidly deployed into the next African Page 28 23 humanitarian disaster. Instituting these recommendations provides no guarantee that complex humanitarian emergencies in Africa will be avoided; however, it is likely that the frequency, cost and magnitude of the subsequent interventions will be less. Ultimately these actions by DoD would expand African nations' capabilities for assuming greater responsibility in African disasters. The United States stands at the brink of an era in which, with great vision and minimal additional expenditure of resources, it can profoundly affect the well-being of a huge area of the world. It is clearly in the national interest to do so. History is scathingly unkind to those who fail to rise to the challenges of their generation.
For up-to- date team by team 1acs go here
Draft as of Sat 7/21
Contention 1: The Horn
Direct aid will fail now – corruption, lack of resources, and poor infrastructure mean that public health systems are non-existent.
Robert I. Rotberg, president of the World Peace Foundation and director of the Program on Intrastate Conflict and Conflict Resolution in the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 2005 (Battling Terrorism in the Horn of Africa, Rotberg (ed.), More quals: professor of political science and history at MIT; academic vice president at Tufts University; president of Lafayette College; Copyright: The World Peace Foundation and Brookings Institution, p. 5-6 [T Chenoweth])
A fourth critical component of governance is the creation of an enabling environment permissive of and conducive to economic growth and prosperity at both national and personal levels. This political good thus encompasses a prudently run money and banking system, usually guided by a central bank and lubricated by a national currency; a fiscal and institutional context within which citizens may pursue individual entrepreneurial goals and potentially prosper; and a regulatory environment appropriate to the economic aspirations and attributes of the nation-state. Only Kenya, reliant on tourism and agricultural exports, has a fully modern economy. Somalia is the outlier at the other end of the economic continuum, and all of the other nation-states are fragile economically. The Sudan has oil, but little else. (Yemen also has oil, but in diminishing amounts.) Yemen has an excellent port in Aden, Djibouti has a smaller port, and Eritrea has two. Ethiopia has coffee. But the real economic attainments of the nation-states of the greater Horn of Africa and Yemen region have been limited, largely because of scarce natural resources and harsh terrain. Moreover, none of the regimes in the region, except Kenya and Djibouti, is even marginally concerned with providing more than the rudiments of this good of economic growth. Additionally, corruption flourishes everywhere in the region, sapping efficiency, limiting foreign direct investment (except into the petroleum industry), and undermining other political goods like the rule of law and security."1 Infrastructure (the physical arteries of commerce), education, and medical treatment are other key political goods, nearly always the responsibilities of governments. Except for Kenya, all of the other countries and areas in the greater region are poor, with underdeveloped road and rail systems, creaking sea and river ports and airports, poor traditional telephone systems and limited teledensity, and low levels of Internet connectivity. Likewise, again except for Kenya and northern Sudan, health and educational systems are either nearly nonexistent or primitive (even by African standards). In the medical services field, for example, in 2001 there was one physician per 35,000 people in Ethiopia, one per 33,000 people in Eritrea, one per 25,000 people in Somalia, one per 11,000 people in the Sudan, one per 7,500 people in Kenya, one per 7,100 people in Djibouti, and one per 5,000 people in Yemen. In terms of the number of hospital beds per 1,000 people, Djibouti had more than two, Kenya and the Sudan more than one, and all the others a few tenths of a bed. Ethiopia had only 0.24 hospital beds per 1,000. Comparing health expenditures as a percentage of GDP, Kenya spent the most (nearly 8 percent), Djibouti and Eritrea followed, and Ethiopia brought up the rear with 1.4 percent.5 It comes as no surprise, given these startlingly low numbers for the delivery of health services, that infant mortality rates per 1,000 live births range from 133 in Somalia and 114 in Ethiopia down to a comparatively welcome figure of fifty-nine in Eritrea. Estimated life expectancy at birth thus ranges from a high of fifty-one years in Eritrea to a low of forty-two in Ethiopia. Only Kenya has a flourishing civil society. In Somalia, civil society is an oxymoron within warlord-controlled fiefdoms. It has been increasingly limited in Eritrea, as the chapter on that country makes evident. In the Sudan, civil society has been repressed in the North by the military rulers who have run the nation-state since 1989; elsewhere civil society is a casualty both of the old North-South war and the new war in Darfur. In Ethiopia, civil society has been slow to develop amid the tight embrace of authoritarianism and because of the restraints of traditional cultures of discourse. In Yemen, formal urban civil society is limited, but there is a long history of discourse and debate within tribal structures.
And, lack of health infrastructure in Africa is a barrier to the success of any other health aid.
Gary Cohen, President of BD Medical, 1-5-07 (http://www.bd.com/press/newsroom/pdfs/3_HC_Infrastructure.pdf)
A primary thrust of these interventions has been provision of vitally needed pharmaceuticals, such as antiretrovirals for HIV/AIDS, to people who otherwise had no access. This will remain critical, but it is far from sufficient. The lack of health care infrastructure and capacity in sub-Saharan Africa is a more fundamental barrier, one that may soon inhibit the ability to deploy further increases in funding. The series of interventions that occurred over the past six years need to be regarded as a first stage which addressed the symptoms of insufficient health care capacity in Africa. It is now time to begin addressing the causes. One example is laboratory services. The provision of drug therapy in the absence of diagnostic testing -- used as a quality control to know when drugs should be administered and whether they are working -- is a potentially dangerous proposition. Already in sub- Saharan Africa there is widespread drug resistance among TB patients. But today, the methodology utilized most commonly in Africa to diagnose TB is over 120 years old. Resistance is also emerging to first line therapies for HIV/AIDS and Malaria. One can only imagine the consequences of massive drug resistance to these three diseases in Africa. Laboratory capabilities and infrastructure will be essential for preventing this. Among the mechanisms for building vitally needed infrastructure in Africa, public private sector partnerships (PPP’s) can play a critical role. With this in mind, BD (Becton, Dickinson and Company) is responding through cross-sector collaboration in the areas of advocacy, knowledge transfer, training, funding, and volunteerism, and by creating access to vitally needed technology on an affordable and sustainable basis. This White Paper identifies additional opportunities for private sector engagement, and we encourage other companies to take similar measures. The goal of improving the health and well being of the citizens of Africa is achievable. In our view, there is no practical alternative other than to devote all necessary efforts across the public and private sectors toward this goal.
Advantage 1: Infrastructure
Djiboutian infrastructure is failing – we must act now to ensure success throughout the entire region.
Robert I. Rotberg, president of the World Peace Foundation and director of the Program on Intrastate Conflict and Conflict Resolution in the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 2005 (Battling Terrorism in the Horn of Africa, Rotberg (ed.), More quals: professor of political science and history at MIT; academic vice president at Tufts University; president of Lafayette College; Copyright: The World Peace Foundation and Brookings Institution, p. 11-12 [T Chenoweth])
Although a majority Somali-populated nation, Djibouti's colonial heritage is French. It never endured the misrule of a despot like Siad Barre, or Mengistu Haile Meriam in Ethiopia. It has been remarkably stable since gaining its independence in 1977; France has always maintained a large military presence outside the city of Djibouti and for many years advised ("controlled") the country's treasury. Because Djibouti is now an American and French garrison town, but more so because this diminutive nation-state guards the southern entrance to the Red Sea across from Yemen, it plays a key role in contemporary counterterror operations and will influence the manner in which the region and its neighbors respond to the challenges and opportunities of improved governance. Moreover, IGAD is based in Djibouti. If Yemen were to become a member or an associate member of IGAD, that organization could help significantly to knit the region together and strengthen its existing bulwarks against the rise and spread of terror. In the battle against terror, the government of Djibouti has been more proactive than others in the region. Despite limited resources, it has removed illegal immigrants for other reasons, shut financial institutions with terrorist links, and cooperated with foreign monitoring and collection operations. Most of all, President Ismail Omar Guelleh has moved determinedly to broker peace in Somalia, especially from 1999 to 2003. He continues to seek to exercise a peacemaking and security-bolstering role among his neighbors and regionally. Washington may wish to find ways to enhance Guelleh's mediation authority for the good of the peoples of the greater Horn of Africa region. But doing so will also mean assisting Djibouti with improving the living standards and economic, political, and social prospects of its own people. Helping to make Djibouti a developmental showcase would not hurt. The country's greatest need is a reliable source of potable water. Its aquifer is rap-idly being depleted and massive investments in modern desalination technology may be justified. With water, Djibouti could successfully irrigate its limited arable land and potentially grow more of its own food.But the people of Djibouti also require viable service and industrial employment opportunities. Creating them would help to mobilize jobs. In Djibouti, as in the region, jobs are at a premium. Creating opportunities for gainful employment is one of the more obvious and most likely methods of reducing the attractiveness of Al Qaeda and similar forms of terrorism. Djibouti could be developed as a regional transportation hub: its port and airport facilities (now managed by Dubai) could be expanded and the Addis Ababa railroad could be refurbished and upgraded. Djiboutians also require better educational opportunities in English, as well as in French and Arabic. From Djibouti's vantage point, writes Lange Schermerhorn in chapter 3 in this volume, everything that happens in the countries of the Horn impacts Djibouti, and conversely, Djibouti's political and economic health and welfare impinges on all of its neighbors. Now, more than ever, Djibouti needs a stable region that is developing in ways that will complement its own potential as a regional services hub. Therefore, policy with regard to Djibouti must be formulated knowing that every action in the region stimulates a reaction. Cooperating and collaborating with other donors to help Djibouti attain its objectives for the delivery of social services, education, and jobs should be an important U.S. policy objective in order to maintain the stability of this major regional entry point.
A. Water –
The Horn is the world’s most severe drought area – more aid is needed now to save 70 million from starvation.
IRIN, 6-26-07 (HORN OF AFRICA: Act now to combat food insecurity - UN officials, http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/IRIN/0fade47a3a4a004d0552236dc4085745.htm [T Chenoweth])
At least 20 million people in the drought-plagued Horn of Africa could need emergency aid if action is not taken immediately to combat food insecurity in the region, United Nations officials said on 26 June. "The Horn is hit by some of the world's most severe food crises and they are coming faster and more [furiously] because of climate change, environmental degradation, political and armed conflicts and a host of other factors," Kjell Magne Bondevik, the UN Special Humanitarian Envoy to the Horn of Africa, told a news conference in Nairobi, the Kenyan capital. "We all now need to show the commitment to end this cycle of despair and disaster, which if not stopped could next see over 20 million people in need of assistance," he said. Bondevik spoke at the end of two days of talks in Nairobi between the six governments of the region - Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia and Uganda; the UN, donors, research organisations, the private sector and non-governmental organisations. The governments and the UN, he said, had agreed on a road map to combat food insecurity. At least 170 projects would be scaled up, including tree planting, rehabilitating land, veterinary services for drought-stricken pastoralists; agricultural advisory services for farmers; bee-keeping; dairy development; fisheries; micro-enterprises; eco-tourism; digging wells and irrigation systems, and establishing vegetable gardens. "Although much has been done in this regard, we must work harder to improve food security in the region; the hard work starts now," Bondevik said. "We have identified what works best and where. The biggest challenge is to scale up successes to extinguish hunger in the Horn rather than just fighting fires each time one breaks out." He added: "If we want to change the Horn so it supports people instead of increasingly making them victims, I appeal to you all to back this campaign on behalf of those brave survivors of one of the harshest environments in the world. Otherwise this failure will only haunt us all." According to a joint statement by the UN World Food Programme (WFP) and the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), at least 70 million people – 45 percent of the total population – in the Horn live in abject poverty and face food shortages. Four major droughts hit the region in the past six years.
And, the impact is linear – the more assistance the less people die each year. Furthermore, these water shortages will create conflict.
Reuters. 11-9-06. “Rich states must help tackle water crisis – UNDP” http://today.reuters.com/News/CrisesArticle.aspx?storyId=L08923976&WTmodLoc=IntNewsHome_C4_Crises-2
CAPE TOWN, Nov 9 (Reuters) - The world's richest states must spearhead efforts to tackle a water and sanitation crisis that is killing and spreading disease among millions and holding back economies, especially in Africa, a U.N. report said on Thursday. The United Nations Development Programme's (UNDP) 2006 Human Development Report recommended that all governments guarantee every person at least 20 litres of clean water a day and spend at least one percent of GDP on water and sanitation. The report, which is regarded as a snapshot on the world's progress on key development issues, also urged the most industrialised countries to raise international aid to poorer nations by $3.4 billion to $4 billion annually. Without concerted action by the G8, a grouping that includes the United States and Britain, millions in the developing world will continue to be plagued by avoidable poverty, poor health and diminished economic opportunities, the report warned. "National governments need to draw up credible plans and strategies for tackling the crisis in water and sanitation," said Kevin Watkins, lead author of the report, which was released in Cape Town. "But we also need a global action plan -- with active buy-in from the G8 countries -- to focus fragmented international efforts to mobilise resources and galvanise political action by putting water and sanitation front and centre on the development agenda," he said. The call to action came amid worrying signs large tracts of the developing world will not meet eight U.N. Millennium development goals agreed by world leaders -- ranging from reducing extreme poverty to halting the spread of AIDS by 2015. If current trends hold, sub-Saharan Africa would only reach the U.N. Millennium clean water target in 2040. The Arab nations are 27 years off the mark. LIVES OF MILLIONS AT STAKE At stake are the lives of millions of children as well as the health and economic well-being of more than two billion others living in developing nations, where drinking contaminated water from drains or streams is often the norm. About 1.8 million children around the world die each year from diarrhoea that could be prevented by access to clean water or a toilet and almost half of those in the developing world are sick at any given time due to poor water and sanitation. Besides health benefits, supporters predict a global clean water campaign would spur economic growth in regions such as sub-Saharan Africa, which loses five percent of its GDP each year due to poor water and sanitation, according to the report. Each dollar invested in water and sanitation improvements would return $8 through increased productivity, reduced healthcare costs and other economic windfalls, especially for the poor who often pay more for clean water, the report stated. Efforts to better manage water resources could also reduce the likelihood of wars and armed conflicts erupting over ownership and access to a basic necessity that is increasingly viewed by governments as a prized economic asset.
B. Roads –
Road infrastructure is lagging behind the rest of the world in Africa, cutting it off from the international economy and creating poverty.
Gumisai Mutume (Writing for Africa Recovery for a U.N Summit Meeting, “Building an efficient road network: Public-private partnerships hold the key to regional infrastructure”. Vol.16 #2-3. 9/02. Page 23 http://www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/vol16no2/162reg4.htm) [Gunnarsdottir]
As far back as the 1960s, architects of African integration agreed that building infrastructure was vital to lubricate the wheels of intra-African trade and distribute its benefits regionally. The continent's leaders embarked on ambitious projects such as the trans-African highways -- segments of which would eventually stretch from Cairo to Dakar, Tripoli to Windhoek and Lagos to Mombasa. These would provide access to the sea to 15 landlocked countries and improve regional links. "Unfortunately, like the economic integration process, regional infrastructure cooperation and integration has not been an outstanding success," notes eminent Nigerian scholar and proponent of integration, Prof. Adebayo Adedeji. At the turn of the millennium a major drawback to trade among African countries remains the dire lack of infrastructure. Crowded road in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania: There are too few roads in Africa, and they are deteriorating. Africa lags behind the rest of the world in all aspects of infrastructure development -- quantity, quality, cost and access. In 1997, Africa (excluding South Africa) had 171,000 kilometres of paved roads -- about 18 per cent less than Poland, a country roughly the size of Zimbabwe. As efforts to complete the trans-African highways continue, the quality of existing roads is deteriorating. In 1992 about 17 per cent of sub-Saharan Africa's primary roads were paved, but by 1998 the figure had fallen to 12 per cent, reports the World Bank. Today, more than 80 per cent of unpaved roads are only in fair condition and 85 per cent of rural feeder roads are in poor condition and cannot be used during the wet season. In Ethiopia, 70 per cent of the population has no access to all-weather roads. In many countries, roads are concentrated in urban areas or around coastal ports -- trade routes established during colonial times for the overseas shipment of commodities. Far fewer roads link neighbouring countries in regional networks. Costly transport woes Poor infrastructure makes the costs of transporting goods in Africa among the highest in the world, notes ECA Executive Secretary K.Y. Amoako. African goods are therefore less competitive with those from other regions. A poor transport system "acts as a non-tariff trade barrier," concurs Prof. Kenneth Button, a public policy expert at George Mason University in the US, who has conducted transportation studies for the European Union. World Bank studies show that a 10 per cent drop in transport costs could result in a 25 per cent increase in total African trade. The Bank also concludes that only about 25 per cent of the decline in Africa's share of world exports can be attributed to poor prices, while the rest is due to non-price factors such as poor infrastructure and information services. Bad roads, aged vehicles and lax regulations also cost lives.
<INSERT POVERTY TYPE IMPACT??? MAYBE DO DISEASE SCENARIO INSTEAD???>
And, the task force creates infrastructure to solve water and transportation issues.
CENTCOM, 12-06 (Fact Sheet, U.S. Central Command: Combined Joint Task Force-Horn Of Africa Mission; http://www.hoa.centcom.mil/resources/english/facts.asp# [T Chenoweth])
The Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa is a unit of United States Central Command that conducts operations and training to assist host nations to combat terrorism in order to establish a secure environment and enable regional stability. The mission is focused on detecting, disrupting and ultimately defeating transnational terrorist groups operating in the region—denying safe havens, external support and material assistance for terrorist activity. CJTF-HOA counters the re-emergence of transnational terrorism in the region through civil-military operations and support of non-governmental organization operations, enhancing the long-term stability of the region. CJTF-HOA provides short-term assistance by providing clean water, functional schools, improved roadways and improved medical facilities. Long-term goals include working with host nations to improve national security. Regional stability is built through capacity building operations such as civil affairs and military-to-military training; engineering and humanitarian support; medical, dental and veterinarian civil action programs (MEDCAP, DENCAP, VETCAP); security training for border and coastal areas; and maritime training with host nations.
Advantage 2: US Leadership
Current military policies create resentment and opposition to US prescence.
Princeton N. Lyman, Adjunct Senior Fellow for Africa Policy Studies at CFR, and J. Stephen Morrison, Director of CSIS Africa Program; Jan/Feb 04 (The Terrorist Threat in Africa., Foreign Affairs, 00157120, Vol. 83, Issue 1, Business Source Complete [T Chenoweth]
In 2002, to combat terrorism in the Horn, the United States created the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), which involves 1,800 U.S. soldiers and is backed by U.S. Central Command. Based in Djibouti, CJTF-HOA's mission is to deter, preempt, and disable terrorist threats emanating principally from Somalia, Kenya, and Yemen, assisted by a multinational naval interdiction force. In June 2003, President Bush announced a $100 million package of counterterrorism measures to be spent in the Horn over 15 months. Half of these funds will support coastal and border security programs administered by the U.S. Department of Defense, $10 million will be spent on the Kenyan Anti-terror Police Unit, and $14 million will support Muslim education. East African governments have been largely receptive to engagement with the United States. Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Uganda even identified themselves as U.S. coalition partners during Operation Iraqi Freedom. But the battle for public opinion is far from won. The travel alerts for Kenya and Tanzania issued by Washington and London in 2003 are a case in point. The advisories were widely unpopular -- disrupting international air traffic and undermining the recovery of the region's tourist trade -- and have intensified debates in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam over the wisdom of partnering with Washington. Strong U.S. support for antiterrorist measures under consideration by the Kenyan Parliament has also provoked anger, particularly from civil libertarians (still reeling from the repressive rule of Daniel arap Moi) and from Muslim clerics (who claim that the proposed controls are fundamentally anti-Islam). If it is to gain local support in Kenya and elsewhere, the United States must adopt a less heavy-handed approach. To achieve this, Washington needs a stronger diplomatic and intelligence presence on the ground. At present, the United States lacks a diplomatic resident in several key locations, including Mombasa, Hargeysa (in northern Somalia), and Zanzibar, and it has weak links to other Muslim areas in East Africa. For example, Washington has yet to overcome its post-1993 phobia about engagement with Somalia, a country that sustains al Qaeda infrastructure inside Kenya. More broadly, it remains to be seen whether the Bush administration can provide sufficient political and financial leadership to back up its multiple and ambitious operations in the region, given worsening budgetary pressures and competing demands in Iraq and Afghanistan.
And, Military outreach operations are a unique issue that develops soft power and trains troops for state building.
CSM, 6-22-07 (Ginny Hill, “Military focuses on development in Africa: In Djibouti, US forces combat terrorism with civil affairs work. Will this be a model for a future US military command in Africa?” http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0622/p07s02-woaf.html [T Chenoweth])
Stephen Morrison, director of the Africa program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, says [that] he believes [that] this far-flung fieldwork provides valuable training opportunities. "They're developing essential deployment skills, such as construction, camp maintenance, and team-building," he says. "And it's an ideal chance to practice community interaction in a semi-hostile environment." Hathaway, whose Djibouti deployment came after five months in Iraq, says [that] a unique aspect of his Hol-Hol mission is exposure to the local population. In Iraq, he survived incoming mortar rounds to build a runway and military housing, but he never left the base. "Here, we see the same people [every day], we're relating one-to-one." In an effort to overcome the language barrier, the Gulfport team defies Djibouti's punishing summer temperatures to play regular soccer matches with the local children. "In the beginning, we were suspicious, but now we've seen that they are good people and they're doing good things for our village," says Abdul-Rahman Bossis, an unemployed Hol-Hol resident. Director of Public Affairs Major David Malakoff says [that] he believes [that] these outreach efforts can foster a positive impression of the American military, but he is honest about the challenge. "How much of a difference are we going to make? That's hard to say. It's not something that we can judge short-term," he says. "Our target group is today's children, so we're not going to know for 10 or 15 years. But we hope that, in the long run, we could be saving lives." Michael O'Hanlon, foreign-policy analyst at the Brookings Institution, thinks that civil-affairs programs "created in partnership with host governments and combined with efforts to foster economic progress can be very useful as part of a broader strategy."
And, hegemony will collapse without progressively changing perceptions toward the military.
New Straits Times, 8-4-01 (R.S. McCoy, “Dangerous and flawed systems,” Saturday forum; Pg. 14, Lexis [T Chenoweth])
In the coming decades of the 21st century, factors most likely to influence the development of conflict are the impact of globalisation on the wealth-poverty divide, environmental constraints on development, climate change, diminishing strategic resources, increasing pressures from mass migration, and the spread of military technologies, not least, missiles and weapons of mass destruction. Anti-elite action from within the marginalised majority and politically motivated paramilitary action indicate a serious lack of structure and culture for dialogue, within the context of middle power states unwilling to accept Western hegemony. The Western perception that the status quo can be maintained by military means is an approach that is not only unjust and ethically unacceptable, but is also not even sustainable in military terms, given the vulnerabilities of urban-industrial states to political violence and asymmetric warfare. It follows that it is necessary to develop a new security paradigm, based on policies likely to enhance peace and limit conflict, by reversing socio-economic polarisation, enforcing sustainable economic development and environmental protection, controlling weapons and missile proliferation, and reducing militarisation. It is essential to learn from the experience of the Cold War and fashion a new security paradigm from those lessons. The Bush administration is attempting to establish rapport with other governments, but hard line unilateral initiatives and withdrawal from international agreements are not helping. The US has a record of cooperation and progressive leadership in the past that lighted the darkness of international relations and enhanced the quest for peace and justice. It cannot now turn away its face and live in the unreal world of exceptionalism.
And, US hegemony is critical to deter a global nuclear war.
Khalilzad, Policy Analyst at the Rand Corporation, 95 (Zalmay, “Losing the Moment?: The United States and the World after the Cold War,” The Washington Quarterly, Spring)
Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global rival or a return to multipolarity for the indefinite future. On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not as an end in itself, but because a world in which the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the global environment would be more open and more receptive to American values -- democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world's major problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership would help preclude the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling the United States and the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange. U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system.
<INSERT AFRICOM SCENARIO???>
<INSERT SOFT POWER KT HARD POWER??>
Advantage 3: Terrorism
Current focus on hard line counter-terrorism fails. More resources are needed to address the root causes of terrorism.
Josh Meyer, LA Times Staff Writer, 3-18-7 (In Terrorism Fight, Diplomacy Gets Shortchanged, http://www.thepeacealliance.org/content/view/307/1/)
President Bush, members of Congress and virtually all counter-terrorism experts have acknowledged that defeating terrorists cannot be accomplished solely by dropping bombs on them. Ultimately, they say, ending terrorism will come only by addressing its underlying causes. "Our long-term strategy to keep the peace is to help change the conditions that give rise to extremism and terror by spreading the universal principle of human liberty," Bush said in March 2005. But a close look at the United States' counter-terrorism priorities shows a strategy going in a different direction. In recent years, the Pentagon has received a larger share of the counter-terrorism budget, whereas "indirect action" programs to win the campaign through diplomacy and other nonmilitary means have struggled for funding and attention, according to a review of budget documents and interviews with dozens of current and former U. S. officials. Nonmilitary counter-terrorism programs have budgets that are measured in millions instead of billions, and in many cases are seeing their funding remain flat or drop. Even within the Pentagon, many "soft power" programs, which don't include direct military action, appear to be getting squeezed out as more money goes to support combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and special forces missions elsewhere. Some top counter-terrorism officials, seeing their noncombat programs languishing, are leaving the government, including a top Pentagon official. Three at the State Department who ran the highly regarded Regional Strategic Initiative are also leaving. And increasingly, even civilian anti-terrorism operations are being run by current or former military members. The shift has troubled many terrorism experts. The U. S. approach to counter-terrorism is that "enemies simply need to be killed or imprisoned so that global terrorism or the Iraqi insurgency will end," Bruce Hoffman, a senior fellow at the Combating Terrorism Center at the U. S. Military Academy, told a House Armed Services subcommittee last month. "This is a monumental failing," Hoffman said, "not only because decapitation strategies have rarely worked in countering mass mobilization, terrorist or insurgent campaigns, but also because Al Qaeda's ability to continue this struggle is … predicated on its capacity to attract new recruits" by publicizing U. S. military actions.
Current military policy makes terrorism inevitable – only revitalizing military aid can solve the global war on terror.
Prof. Thomas P.M. Barnett, Senior Strategic Researcher at the U.S. Naval War College and Senior Managing Director of Enterra Solutions, 6-27-07 (Esquire, “The Americans Have Landed,” http://www.esquire.com/features/africacommand0707 [T Chenoweth])
"We could have solved all of East Africa in less than eight weeks," says the Centcom source, who was involved in the planning. Central Command was extremely wary of being portrayed in the media as Ethiopia's puppet master. In fact, its senior leaders wanted to keep America's participation entirely secret. The goal was for Ethiopia to get all the credit, further bolstering America's controversial but burgeoning military ties with Meles Zenawi's increasingly authoritarian regime. Proud Kenya, still visibly nervous from the 1998 embassy bombing, would have been happy with a very quiet thank-you. It was a good plan. And it was leaked to the press almost as soon as it started. Those involved in the Central Command operation suspected two sources: 1) somebody in the Office of the Secretary of Defense who couldn't wait to trumpet their success to bitter personal rivals in the State Department, or 2) a dime dropper from our embassy in Kenya who simply couldn't stand the notion that the Pentagon had once again suckered State into a secret war. The first New York Times piece in early January broke the story of the initial AC-130 bombardment, incorrectly identifying a U.S. military base in Djibouti as the launching point. That leak just let the cat out of the bag, tipping off the main target, a senior CIC leader named Aden Hashi Ayro, who, according to Centcom intelligence, had been completely fooled up to that point, thinking the Ethiopians had somehow gotten the jump on him. Ayro survived his injuries, and he's now back in action in Mogadishu and, by all accounts, mad as hell at both the Ethiopians and the Americans. Six weeks and a second Times story later, the shit really hit the fan in Addis Ababa. Now the intensely proud Ethiopians, who had done all the heavy lifting in the operation, were being portrayed as bit players in their own war -- simpleton proxies of the fiendishly clever Americans. After angry denials were issued (Meles's spokesman called the story a "fabrication"), the Ethiopians decided that if the Americans were so hot to mastermind another intervention in Somalia, they would just wash their hands of this mess as quickly as possible. The return of the foreign fighters to Mogadishu's nasty mix, along with Ethiopia's fit of pique, quickly sent the situation in Somalia spiraling downward. The transitional Somali government, backed by the United Nations, is faltering, and in scenes reminiscent of America's last misadventures in Mog, both Ethiopian troops and African Union peacekeepers are taking fire from 360 degrees' worth of pissed-off Somali clans determined to -- once again -- drive off the invading infidels. Osama bin Laden himself couldn't have written a better ending. Naturally, it wasn't supposed to happen this way. America's Central Command set up shop in Djibouti in May 2003, moving ashore a Marine-led Joint Task Force that had been established six months earlier aboard the command ship Mount Whitney to capture and kill Al Qaeda fighters fleeing American forces in Afghanistan and Iraq. The task force did register one immediate big hit in November 2002: A top Al Qaeda leader was taken out in Yemen by a Hellfire air-to-ground missile launched from an unmanned Predator drone in a scene right out of Syriana. But other than that, the great rush of rats fleeing the sinking ship has not yet materialized, and so the Marines took up residence in an old French Foreign Legion base located on Djibouti's rocky shore, just outside the capital. Uncomfortable just sitting around, the Marines quickly refashioned the task force with the blessing of General John Abizaid, then head of Central Command, who envisioned Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) as a sort of strategic inoculant. If the Marines weren't going to get to kill anybody, then they'd train the locals to do it instead. But CJTF-HOA, whose area of responsibility stretched from Sudan down to Kenya, soon evolved into something so much more: an experiment in combining defense, diplomacy, and development -- the so-called three-D approach so clearly lacking in America's recent postwar reconstruction efforts elsewhere. Because the task force didn't own the sovereign space it was operating in, as U.S. forces in Afghanistan and Iraq did, the Marines were forced to work under and through the American ambassadors, their State Department country teams, and the attached U.S. Agency for International Development missions. If little of that cooperation was occurring in Kabul and Baghdad, then maybe Africa would be better suited. The Horn of Africa was supposed to be Washington's bureaucratic mea culpa for the Green Zone, a proving ground for the next generation of interagency cooperation that fuels America's eventual victory in what Abizaid once dubbed the "long war" against radical Islam. But as its first great test in Somalia demonstrated, the three D's are still a long way from being synchronized, and as the Pentagon sets up its new Africa Command in the summer of 2008, the time for sloppy off-Broadway tryouts is running out. Eventually, Al Qaeda's penetration of Muslim Africa will happen -- witness the stunning recent appearance of suicide bombers in Casablanca -- and either the three D's will answer this challenge, or this road show will close faster than you can say "Black Hawk down."
And, the US must build up its military aid to Africa to destroy terrorist shelters and funding mechanisms globally.
Princeton N. Lyman, Adjunct Senior Fellow for Africa Policy Studies at CFR, and J. Stephen Morrison, Director of CSIS Africa Program; Jan/Feb 04 (The Terrorist Threat in Africa., Foreign Affairs, 00157120, Vol. 83, Issue 1, Business Source Complete [T Chenoweth]
ON AUGUST 7, 1998, two massive bombs exploded outside of the U.S. embassies in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya, killing 224 people -- including 12 Americans -- and injuring 5,000. Responsibility was quickly traced to al Qaeda. Four years later, al Qaeda operatives struck again, killing 15 people in an Israeli-owned hotel near Mombasa, Kenya, and simultaneously firing missiles at an Israeli passenger jet taking off from Mombasa's airport. An alarmed United States responded to these attacks with conviction. In addition to proposing significant increases in development assistance and a major initiative on HIV/AIDS, the Bush administration has designated the greater Horn of Africa a front-line region in its global war against terrorism and has worked to dismantle al Qaeda infrastructure there. At the same time, however, the United States has failed to recognize the existence of other, less visible, terrorist threats elsewhere on the African continent. Countering the rise of grass-roots extremism has been a central part of U.S. strategy in the Middle East, but the same has not generally been true for Africa. In Nigeria, for example, a potent mix of communal tensions, radical Islamism, and anti-Americanism has produced a fertile breeding ground for militancy and threatens to tear the country apart. South Africa has seen the emergence of a violent Islamist group. And in West and Central Africa, criminal networks launder cash from illicit trade in diamonds, joining forces with corrupt local leaders to form lawless bazaars that are increasingly exploited by al Qaeda to shelter its assets. As the war on terrorism intensifies in Kenya and elsewhere, radicals might migrate to more accessible, war-ravaged venues across the continent. The Bush administration must deal with these threats by adopting a more holistic approach to fighting terrorism in Africa. Rather than concentrate solely on shutting down existing al Qaeda cells, it must also deal with the continent's fundamental problems -- economic distress, ethnic and religious fissures, fragile governance, weak democracy, and rampant human rights abuses -- that create an environment in which terrorists thrive. The United States must also eliminate the obstacles to developing a coherent Africa policy that exist in Washington. Counterterrorism programs for the region are consistently underfinanced, responsibilities are divided along archaic bureaucratic lines, there is no U.S. diplomatic presence in several strategic locations, and long-term imperatives are consistently allowed to be eclipsed by short-term humanitarian demands. The war on terrorism might make officials realize what they should have known earlier: that Africa cannot be kept at the back of the queue forever if U.S. security interests are to be advanced.
And, terrorism threatens the survival of civilization
Yonah Alexander, professor and director of the Inter-University for Terrorism Studies in Israel and the United States. “Terrorism Myths and Realities,” Washington Times. August 27, 2003.
http://www.washingtontimes.com/commentary/20030827-084256-8999r.htm
Last week's brutal suicide bombings in Baghdad and Jerusalem have once again illustrated dramatically that the international community failed, thus far at least, to understand the magnitude and implications of the terrorist threats to the very survival of civilization itself. Even the United States and Israel have for decades tended to regard terrorism as a mere tactical nuisance or irritant rather than a critical strategic challenge to their national security concerns. It is not surprising, therefore, that on September 11, 2001, Americans were stunned by the unprecedented tragedy of 19 al Qaeda terrorists striking a devastating blow at the center of the nation's commercial and military powers. Likewise, Israel and its citizens, despite the collapse of the Oslo Agreements of 1993 and numerous acts of terrorism triggered by the second intifada that began almost three years ago, are still "shocked" by each suicide attack at a time of intensive diplomatic efforts to revive the moribund peace process through the now revoked cease-fire arrangements (hudna). Why are the United States and Israel, as well as scores of other countries affected by the universal nightmare of modern terrorism surprised by new terrorist "surprises"? There are many reasons, including misunderstanding of the manifold specific factors that contribute to terrorism's expansion, such as lack of a universal definition of terrorism, the religionization of politics, double standards of morality, weak punishment of terrorists, and the exploitation of the media by terrorist propaganda and psychological warfare. Unlike their historical counterparts, contemporary terrorists have introduced a new scale of violence in terms of conventional and unconventional threats and impact. The internationalization and brutalization of current and future terrorism make it clear we have entered an Age of Super Terrorism (e.g. biological, chemical, radiological, nuclear and cyber) with its serious implications concerning national, regional and global security concerns.
Plan: The United States federal government should substantially increase its public health assistance to sub-Saharan Africa by expanding the public health infrastructure programs of the United States Combined Joint Task Force for the Horn of Africa.
Contention 2: We’re Topical –
Health infrastructure is key to public health
Pekka Puska (“WHO Director—General election: public health infrastructures” 10/27/06 Pg. 1401 Vol. 368 No. 9545 ISSN: 0140-6736 p. Lexis) [Gunnarsdottir]
Without a concerted effort by WHO and others to strengthen public-health infrastructure, existing public-health programmes will not realise their potential and new ones will not be fully implemented. More urgently, without strong public-health infrastructures, countries will not be able to respond rapidly and in a coordinated manner to threats such as pandemic influenza. A centrally organised national public-health infrastructure is essential to ensuring that essential public-health functions, as defined by the Pan American Health Organization,4 are met. Such an infrastructure-including a coordinated system for outbreak investigation, monitoring, and surveillance, training, health education, research, laboratory services, and other functions-is vital to success, in both chronic and infectious diseases.
Contention 3: Solvency
They can’t win a unique disad – the US is increasing efforts now but they only create false commitment.
Princeton N. Lyman, Adjunct Senior Fellow for Africa Policy Studies at CFR, and J. Stephen Morrison, Director of CSIS Africa Program; Jan/Feb 04 (The Terrorist Threat in Africa., Foreign Affairs, 00157120, Vol. 83, Issue 1, Business Source Complete [T Chenoweth]
Even more critical than combating al Qaeda's financial maneuvering is confronting the cause of the organization's regional resurgence: the anarchy and conflict engendered by West and Central Africa's failed and failing states. To date, the United States has offered neither the leadership nor the resources needed to deal with this problem properly. U.S. local diplomatic capacities remain weak, and initiatives are episodic and vulnerable to downward budgetary pressures. Each time the United States appears to offer greater commitment to the region, it pulls back, suggesting that the administration does not see it as a critical part of its global antiterrorist strategy.
And, success of the task force is key to AFRICOM and continent wide solvency - this prevents future interventions and conflict.
Prof. Thomas P.M. Barnett, Senior Strategic Researcher at the U.S. Naval War College and Senior Managing Director of Enterra Solutions, 6-27-07 (Esquire, “The Americans Have Landed,” http://www.esquire.com/features/africacommand0707 [T Chenoweth])
America is going to have an Africa Command for the same reason people buy real estate -- it's a good investment. Too many large, hostile powers surround Central Asia for the radical jihadists to expand there, but Africa? Africa's the strategic backwater of the world. Nobody cares about Africa except Western celebrities. So as the Middle East middle-ages over the next three decades and Asia's infrastructural build-out is completed, only Africa will remain as a source for both youth-driven revolution and cheap labor and commodities. Toss in global warming and you've got a recipe for the most deprived becoming the most depraved. The U.S., through its invasion and botched occupation of Iraq, has dramatically sped up globalization's frightening reformatting process in the Middle East, and with Africa on deck, the United States military is engaging in a highly strategic flanking maneuver. Africa Command promises to be everything Central Command has failed to become. It will be interagency from the ground up. It will be based on interactions with locals first and leaders second. It will engage in preemptive nation-building instead of preemptive regime change. It will "reduce the future battlespace" that America has neither intention nor desire to own. It'll be Iraq done right. Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa here in Djibouti is the clear model for what comes next, according to Rear Admiral Bob Moeller, who heads up the Defense Department's transition team planning Africom's structure. It is the franchise that will be replicated across the entire continent.
And, the plan solves public health infrastructure which spills over to terrorism and good governance. Other measures are impossible unless the military acts first.
Robert I. Rotberg, president of the World Peace Foundation and director of the Program on Intrastate Conflict and Conflict Resolution in the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 2005 (Battling Terrorism in the Horn of Africa, Rotberg (ed.), More quals: professor of political science and history at MIT; academic vice president at Tufts University; president of Lafayette College; Copyright: The World Peace Foundation and Brookings Institution, p. 6-8 [T Chenoweth])
The eradication both of existing terrorist cells and potential future terrorist threats and combinations cannot be achieved without careful, considered attention to uplifting governance in general throughout the region and boosting particular political goods selectively, country by country. Yet, even if the United States and the European Union (EU) were to expend appropriate sums to assist the governments of the region with improving aspects of governance, not all of these nation-states would embrace or welcome such initiatives. Few are anxious to chance their control or dominance internally. Few are as desirous as they might be, and fewer are able, to deliver political goods of the quality and in the quantities that would significantly help to achieve the aspirations of their peoples. The quality of the rule of law or economic enablement, much less domestic security and political freedom, will not change for the better without newly created partnerships forged for such ends between the United States, the EU, and many if not all of the countries in the greater Horn of Africa region. Hence, because the United States desperately wants to reduce the threat of terrorism, Washington must craft new, broad policy initiatives toward the region as a whole and toward the critical nation-states individually. CJTF-HOA, understaffed as it is, cannot be expected to bear the burden of nation building in the Horn of Africa and Yemen. There are ample opportunities for multinational coordination with regard to improving good governance in the region. France has long had a military and political presence in Djibouti. Italy has an interest, from colonial times, in the region, especially Somalia and Eritrea. Britain has colonial links to Kenya, Somaliland, and the Sudan. Norway played a substantial role in negotiating a peace agreement between the Sudan's North and South. The EU as a whole has a variety of ties to the region and to individual countries. The United States once had an important listening post in Eritrea, enjoys naval rights in Kenya, was alternately allied with Ethiopia and Somalia, and has suffered direct attack in Yemen and Kenya. It also has a military base in Djibouti. Americans and Europeans should cooperate to increase governmental capabilities in the region. Working together, they can build new and maintain existing infrastructures. They can find ways to create jobs in a region typified by high unemployment. Local educational efforts are few, leading to high rates of underemployment among secondary school leavers and others with less training. Europeans and Americans can direct their attention to such critical needs, can upgrade health facilities in the crucial battles against HIV/AIDS (increasingly a menace to Ethiopia and Somalia), tuberculosis, and malaria, as well as against dangerous epizootic diseases like Rift Valley fever and rinderpest. They should support local efforts to embed the rule of law and expand political freedom. Positive activities in each of these arenas will directly and indirectly strengthen security and counterterrorism capabilities. The battle against terrorism is as much, if not more, a battle for improved governance and, as a consequence, for local hearts and minds. Although France, Italy, and Britain have a long-standing expert knowledge of portions of the region and high-level staff fluent in local languages, the United States no longer possesses the regional expertise and capable linguists that it once had in the Department of State, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the several military services. Indeed, the greater Horn of Africa region (Yemen excepted) is in too many respects a terra incognita to Washington. Intelligence personnel responsible for overseeing the region may have no direct acquaintance with it. U.S. embassies and consulates are fewer than they were in the 1980s; budget cuts and personnel retrenchments have left U.S. diplomatic, intelligence, and military services impoverished in terms of an intimate knowledge of the region and the countries that it comprises. Although Washington helped to ensure the ultimate delivery of the Sudanese peace pact of early 2005, there was still no permanent American ambassador resident in Khartoum (based elsewhere since 1997) and no equivalent presence in Somalia. Indeed, Washington lacks any coherent vision for integrating and advancing American diplomatic and security initiatives in the region. The struggle against terrorism requires just such a far-ranging vision, directed and coordinated at the highest levels. The battle against terror in the vulnerable countries along the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean is best prosecuted from a holistic regional perspective. The threat is transnational and respects no boundaries. In any event, none of
international land or sea borders presents an effective barrier to infiltrators. Drugs and arms smugglers and cattle and sheep rustlers can cross almost anywhere at will. A history of interpenetration, long decades of evasion, tribal or warrior dominance of frontier areas remote from national capitals, adherence to customary entrepreneurial obligations, and the absence of robust security contingents beyond major cities make regional measures and cooperation necessary, urgent, and probably insufficient. The regional Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) tries weakly to organize relevant common responses. Bringing Yemen into IGAD would be sensible, and helpful in forging a more vigorous common approach to terror and its eradication. (But Yemen may not wish to be considered "African," and IGAD members might resist the inclusion of a new country.) There is no substitute for greater U.S. involvement in any and all forums for the greater Horn of Africa region and Yemen. As important as a vastly strengthened regional approach will be, Washington also needs a nuanced new policy crafted for and appropriate to the region and each of its countries.
And, military health assistance creates sustainable health care by developing African capabilities.
William Fox, Command Surgeon of the Joint Readiness Training Center, 97 (MILITARY MEDICAL OPERATIONS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: THE DoD "POINT OF THE SPEAR" FOR A NEW CENTURY, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub202.pdf)
As a matter of "homeland defense," the United States must increase disease surveillance and research in Africa and elsewhere in the developing world. The basic capability currently exists in DoD, though it is extremely limited. An expanded capability must include cooperative efforts with African nations that emphasize outbreak isolation, containment and elimination. This action will directly assist African nations in attenuating disease threats, and allow them to build the capabilities to provide their own containment and elimination programs for the future. Research and surveillance clinics, staffed by U. S. and host nation personnel, should be established in each of the four major subregions of the subcontinent (east, west, central and south). It is worth noting that these activities will afford the United States an enhanced capability to deal not only with "acts Page 27 22 of nature," but also with deliberate uses of biological weapons by a future enemy. • Increasing the national disease surveillance efforts should be linked with an increase in exercises of the scope and capability of the 1994/1995 MEDFLAG series. Such exercises should focus on education and training to improve disease prevention, hygiene, public sanitation, disease vector control methods, disaster management and medical expertise for cases of mass refugees. Medical civic action projects must focus on assisting the host nation in projecting and stabilizing the medical infrastructure and medical care capability within the areas of greatest need. Mass immunization of children, basic dental and medical care, and medical "train the trainer" programs are highly effective. These exercises greatly enhance the skills of personnel and units in combined and joint task force operations. The relatively low threat environment makes it a good training venue. This deliberate planning and execution can better prepare U. S. military units and higher commands for more rapid response requirements such as disaster relief. The additional benefit of having worked with and trained numerous African personnel could facilitate the rapid inclusion of trained African medical care responders in future disaster relief operations in Africa and elsewhere in the world. • As an admittedly more complex and problematic issue, DoD must have a regional or sub-unified command that can provide a full-time focus on Africa. As noted earlier, the African continental land mass falls under the responsibility of two U. S. military commands (the U. S. European Command and the U. S. Central Command) whose primary focus is elsewhere. Islands surrounding the continent fall under the purview of other commands. The U. S. European Command, in times of crisis in Europe, cannot devote the necessary attention to the 40 African countries that are within its area of responsibility. DoD can no longer afford simply to wait and react to the next crisis in Africa. A regional command separate from the U. S. European Command or the U. S. Central Command should be established to evaluate, plan and execute regional military exercises and operations. A more specific regional focus would enhance DoD coordination and cooperation with the country teams, USAID, NGOs, and PVOs, as well as African organizations such as the Organization of African Unity. One result of instituting just these three DoD changes will be a powerful preventive defense program which, if melded with a preventive diplomacy program, could have a significant bearing on African regional stability. A failure to implement these changes will, at a minimum, ensure that larger and less-well-prepared forces must be rapidly deployed into the next African Page 28 23 humanitarian disaster. Instituting these recommendations provides no guarantee that complex humanitarian emergencies in Africa will be avoided; however, it is likely that the frequency, cost and magnitude of the subsequent interventions will be less. Ultimately these actions by DoD would expand African nations' capabilities for assuming greater responsibility in African disasters. The United States stands at the brink of an era in which, with great vision and minimal additional expenditure of resources, it can profoundly affect the well-being of a huge area of the world. It is clearly in the national interest to do so. History is scathingly unkind to those who fail to rise to the challenges of their generation.